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NOTES
MICHAEL H. v. GERALD D.: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE
FATHERS AND A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Presently, if a putative father' has developed a substantial pa-
rental relationship with his child, and the mother of the child is
unmarried at the time of birth, it is a violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to terminate the putative fa-
ther's parental rights without a judicial hearing. 2 If, however, the
child's mother is married to another man at the time of birth the
putative father's constitutional rights are radically altered, and he
is no longer entitled to a judicial hearing prior to the termination
of his parental rights. 5 Prior to the 1972 case of Stanley v. Illinois, 4
the rights and obligations of a putative father with regard to his
children were controlled almost exclusively by legislative enact-
ments. 5 The Stanley case created a new area of common law that
dealt specifically with the rights of putative fathers." Michael H. v.
Gerald D. is the most recent Supreme Court case dealing with the
putative father's right to prevent the termination of his parental
relationship with his child.'
1 This note uses the term "putative father" to refer to any man who is biologically, or
potentially biologically, a child's father, and who attempts to be named that child's rathet,
but has not yet been adjudicated the rather.
2 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972).
3 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341; (1989).
4
 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
At common law, the putative father had virtually no rights with regard to his children.
Continent, Delineation of the Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights: A Psychological Parenthood
Perspective, 15 SE•ON HALL L. REV. 290, 294 (1985) (hereinafter C011111101L, Boundaries of
Putative Fathers' Rights]; see also 'Fabler, Parental Rights in the Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate
Complaints on Behalf of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAM, L. 231, 231-32 (1971). (Tablet states that
in the United States, the general rule in 1971 was that a putative father had almost tto legal
rights in his illegitimate chiklren). With the advent or adoption, a proceeding that did not
exist at common law, many states enacted legislation that defined the rights or the putative
rather in these proceedings. Comment, Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights, supra, at 296.
Comment, Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights, supra note 5, at 298 n.57, 303.
109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
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Because this is a relatively new and unsettled area of law, there
is an acute need for guidance concerning the potential constitutional
rights of the putative father who wishes to assert his paternity. 8
Michael H., however, was resolved by a plurality, which limits the
precedential value of the opinion and weakens the Court's ability
to resolve these uncertainties. 9 Thus, without a complete and thor-
ough analysis of the opinions of the Court, this case will serve only
to confuse, rather than clarify, the law regarding the rights of
putative fathersi°
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., a putative father initiated an action
for filiation" over a child who had been born to a married woman.' 2
The California Superior Court dismissed the action and held that
because the child had been born to a married woman, California
law conclusively presumed her husband to be the child's father."
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court. 14
 The
United States Supreme Court also affirmed, reasoning that it is
" UNIV. PUTATIVE AND UNKNOWN FATHERS Act (UPUEA), Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 22
(Supp. 1990).
109 S. Ct. at 2336. See Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions,
80 Comm. L. REV. 756, 756, 759 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Precedential Value] ("[B]ecause
they [plurality decisions] do not provide any single line of reasoning supported by a clear
majority of the Court, these decisions pose substantial difficulties For lower courts attempting
to ascertain their precedential value. . .").
I" Note, Precedential Value, supra note 9, at 756, 759.
° Filiation is -"a judicial determination of paternity" or "Nile relation of the child to the
father." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (5th ed. 1979).
100 S. Ct. at 2337. Victoria D., the child, joined with Michael H. in this action, because
her guardian ad litem had determined that it was in Victoria's best interests for Michael to
have visitation privileges. Id. Because this note focuses on punitive fathers, it will not discuss
Victoria's involvement in the case.
" Id. at 2338. The Superior Court made its decision on the basis of section 621 of the
California Evidence Code, which states in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (h), the issue of a wife
cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively
presumed to be a child of the marriage.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a), if the court finds that
the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon blood
tests performed pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 890) of
Division 7 are that the husband is not the father of the child, the question of
paternity of the husband will be resolved accordingly.
(c) The notice of motion llor blood tests under subdivision (b) may be raised
by the husband not later than two years from the child's date of birth.
(d) The notice of motion for blood tests tinder subdivision (b) May be raised
by the mother of the child not later than two years from the child's date of
birth the child's biological father has filed an affidavit with the court acknowl-
edging paternity of' the child.
CALIF. EV1D. CODE 621 (West Supp. 1990).
" 109 S. Ct. at 2338.
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constitutionally permissible for a state to terminate a putative fa-
ther's parental rights without a judicial hearing if the child's mother
is married to another man at the time of birth.'' Justice Scalia wrote
the main opinion for the plurality and was joined by Justice Rehn-
quist. 1 °' justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part, in
which Justice Kennedy joined.° justice Stevens concurred in the
judgment.'"
Prior to Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Supreme Court had ruled
on four cases, collectively known as the Stanley line of cases, dealing
with the rights of putative fathers.'`-' In the 1972 case of Stanley v.
Illinois, the Court held that an Illinois statute containing the conclu-
sive presumption that all putative fathers were unlit parents was
unconstitutional. 2" Six years later, in 1978, the Court held that a
putative father could be denied the right to veto an adoption pro-
ceeding because he had neither taken an active role in raising his
child nor attempted to legitimate the child during the first eleven
years of the child's life. 2 ' In 1979, the Court determined that when
a father takes an.active role in the raising and support of the child
and admits his paternity, the equal protection clause does not allow
the state to deny the father a veto power over adoptions while
simultaneously granting the mother the right to veto adoptions. 22
Finally, in 1983, the Court held that a putative father who had not
developed any substantial parental relationship with his child, and
had failed to provide proper notice of his paternity claim to the
state, was not entitled to notice prior to a proceeding to adopt his
child."
Prior to 1972, putative fathers did not have a constitutionally
protected right to maintain a parental relationship with their chil-
dren." The Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act ("UP-
1 " Id. at 2346.
1 " bi.at 2336. Michael H. is a plurality decision because no single opinion received the
support of a majority or justices. I refer to justice Scalia's opinion as the main opinion,
because it received more support than Justice Stevens's opinion, and the dissent focused on
criticizing Justice Scalia's opinion.
17 Id, at 2346.
L " Id, at 2347.
19 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S, 248 (1983); Cabal] v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
20 405 U.S. at 658.
21 Quit/oin, 434 U.S. at 256.
22 Cuban, 441 U.S. at 394.
2" Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263-65,267-68.
" See Comment, Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights, supra note 5, :it 296.
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UFA"), approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1988, codifies the Stanley line of cases,
thereby providing state courts and legislatures with a standard in-
terpretation of this case law. 25 If a majority of state legislatures
enacts the UPUFA, it will have a stabilizing effect on this unsettled
area of law and insure that the state fully protects the constitutional
rights of putative fathers. 26
. This note analyzes the current state of the law surrounding
putative fathers' rights. Section 1 of this note presents a general
discussion of the present state of putative fathers' rights, including
a brief historical overview of paternity and recent Supreme Court
cases. 27 Section II analyzes the meaning and precedential value of
Michael H. v. Gerald D. 28 Section II also evaluates the beneficial
effects of adopting the UPUFA and concludes that only by adopting
the UPUFA can putative fathers' constitutional rights be pro-
tected
1. PUTATIVE FATHERS' RIGHTS
A. Early Common Law Principles, State Statutes, and the Uniform
Parentage Act
English common law burdened an illegitimate child with a legal
status that . deprived the child of most of the legal rights accorded
to a legitimate child." According to Blackstone, illegitimate children
could either be classified as fillius nullius, "the son of no one," or as
fillies populi, "the son of the people."'" Some scholars interpret the
doctrine of filliks nullius as depriving the putative father of both
custody rights and support obligations, but there is not universal.
agreement on this interpretation. 32 Fillius nullius, however, should
25 UNIT. PUTATIVE AND UNKNOWN FATHERS Am', Prefatory Note, 913 U.L.A. 22 (Supp.
1990).
26 See infra notes 215-245 and 328-350 and accompanying text for a discussion of
UPUFA.
27 See infra notes 30-290 and accompanying text.
sx See infra notes 291-326 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 327-350 and accompanying text.
" See Comment, Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights, supra note 5, at 294-95.
" 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •458.
" Comment, Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights, supra note 5, at 27 (citing Note,
Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13 J.'
FAM. L. 115,119 n.26 (1973-74)).
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be distinguished from fillius populi, which is a custodial principle."
Under the doctrine of fillius populi, neither the mother nor the
father was recognized as the legal parent, and, therefore, the local
church or parish received custody of the child. 34 Later, however,
the English equity courts altered the principle of fillius populi and
granted the mother custody of the child while depriving the father
of all custodial rights."' A separate legal principle, referred to as
the conclusive marital presumption, dealt with an illegitimate child
born to a married wornan. 3" According to this principle, any child
born to a married woman was presumed to be a legitimate child of
the marriage. 37
American common law adopted many of the English common
law principles with regard to the rights of putative fathers. 38 Some
state courts modified these general principles and granted the pu-
tative father custody rights superior to all but the child's mother."
According to some commentators, however, most state laws denied
putative fathers the right to have a role in the raising of their
children."
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Parentage Act
("UPA"),4 ' there was no uniform American law of illegitimacy. 42
Instead, two major types of legislation developed in response to the
common law principles of illegitimacy." One approach was "defi-
nitional" and sought to limit the scope of the problem by narrowly
defining illegitimacy. 44 Statutes that codify the conclusive marital
presumption are examples of such definitional statutes." Legiti-
R.A.W. Howe, Proposed Uniform Rights of Putative Fathers Act Draft Six—Due
Process and Equal Protection Issues 1 (Aug. 1987) (unpublished report on the sixth draft of
the Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act, previously titled the Uniform Rights of
Putative Fathers Act, available front Boston College Law School).
34 Comment, Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights, supra note 5, at 294-95 n.32.
sr Id. at 295.
1" Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 360, 371 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption].
ST Id.
38 See, Krause, A Proposed Unifirrm Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEx. L. REV. 829, 831 (1966).
19
 Comment, Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights, supra note 5, at 296.
40 'Fabler, supra note 5, at 231.
1 ' The UPA was the second attempt by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws to create a uniform statute dealing with the rights of illegitimate children.
UNW. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1987). An earlier uniform law, entitled
the Uniform Paternity Act, never gained widespread acceptance. Id.
42 Krause, suprdnote 38, at 830.
43 Id. at 84I.
44 Id .
45 Id. at 844-45. Currently, about one third of the states have conclusive marital pre-
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illation statutes allowed the father to legitimate his child by volun-
tarily accepting paternity.'" Most legitimation statutes, however,
were vague and gave little guidance concerning the proper proce-
dure for legitimation, and even less explanation as to what rights
legitimation conferred upon . the putative father. 47 The second ap-
proach to the problem of illegitimacy sought to limit the burdens
of illegitimacy. 48 The state, through legislative enactment, typically
accomplished this by creating a cause of action for paternity that
allowed the mother or the state to place a legal obligation on the
putative father to support his child. 4 "
In 1973, in response to this lack of consistency, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the
Ul'A. 5° The major purpose of the UPA was to remove the legal and
social stigmas that traditional state laws attached to illegitimate chil-
dren. 5 r The UPA also reflected the growing realization that many
state illegitimacy laws violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution . 52
To promote the equality and rights of illegitimate children, the
UPA defines the parent-child relationship" and states that "[t]he
parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to
every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." 54 To
facilitate determinations of paternity,55 the UPA includes a codifi-
cation of the conclusive marital presumption. 5" Commentators have
sumption statutes. See Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption, .supra note 36, at 373-74. For
examples of state statutes that have retained conclusive marital presumptions, see ALA, Coot:
§§ 26-17-1 to 26-17-21 (1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.51-74 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987):
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-17-01 to 14-17-26 (1981 & Supp. 1987); Outio REV. COPE ANN.
§§ 3111.01—.19 (Baldwin 1986); and lAryo, SLAT. §§ 14-2-101 to 14-2-120 (1987). Note,
Rebutting the Marital Presuraption„supra note 36, at 374 n.47.
" Krause, supra note 38, at 845.
47
 'Fabler, supra note 5, at 236.
4" Krause, supra note 38, at 841.
," Id. at 848.
" UNIE. PARENTACE ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1987). In 1960, the Conference
had adopted the Uniform Paternity Act, but by 1973 only four states had enacted the Act.
51 Id. at 289.
Id. at 288-89.
59 Section 1 of the Uniform Parentage Act states:
[als used in this Act, 'parent and child relationship' means the legal relationship
existing between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to which
the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. It includes
the mother and child relationship and the father and child relationship.
Id., § 1, at 296.
" Id.
59 Id. at 289.
w Id., §§ 4-6, at 298-303 (1987).
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characterized this presumption as "exclusive" because it does not
give a putative father any right of rebuttal.''
Although the UPA does not specifically address the rights of
putative fathers, it does attempt to deal with the rights of presumed
or legal fathers" as they relate to the adoption of their illegitimate
children." Specifically, the UPA provides for the father's right to
notice of judicial proceedings that affect his parental relationship
and the procedure that. such notice must follow." These sections,
however, only discuss the rights of a man who has been judicially
determined to be the child's father or is presumed to be a child's
father under the UPA."' The UPA is silent concerning the rights
of putative fathers who have been prevented from asserting their
paternity."2 Thus, in the early 1970s, the American law of illegiti-
macy was a mix of English common law principles, non-uniform
statutory schemes, and the UPAP At this juncture, the United
States Supreme Court added a new constitutional dimension to the
rights of putative fathers when it decided the case of Stanley v.
Illinois."
B. The Stanley Line of Cases
In 1972, one year before the UPA was adopted, the United
States Supreme Court, in Stanley v. Illinois, recognized that the Con-
stitution protects putative fathers' parental relationships. 65 Prior to
Stanley, the general rule was that the child's mother exclusively
determined a father's visitation rights. 6" I F the mother denied the
putative father the right to visit. his child, then the putative father
had no visitation rights. 67 The mother's actions also largely deter-
57 Note, Rehuiting the Marital Prekumption, supra note 36, al 374.
58 For the purposes of this note, a "presumed" father is a man presumed to be a child's
lather under the UPA, whereas a "legal" father is any man who has been adjudicated to be
a child's father.
" See UNIE PARENTAGE ACT, §§ 24-25, 9B U.L.A. 336-43 (1987).
6" Id.
ea Id.
For example, section 25 [Proceeding to Terminate Parental Rights] discusses only the
disinterested father, but does not give guidance as to how the court should protect the rights
of a putative father who has been actively prevented from developing a parental relationship.
Id., § 25,911 340-43 (1987).
64 See, e.g., Krause, Aupra. note 38, at 829-31.
8.1 405 U.S. 645,658 (1972).
"5 Id.
'6 'Fabler, supra note 5, at 231.
67 Id.
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mined the putative father's custody rights." 8 Similarly, most state
laws provided that a putative father could not block the adoption
of his child,"9 nor was he entitled to notice that an adoption pro-
ceeding had been initiated. 7°
The Stanley Court specifically held that the state of Illinois could
not constitutionally deprive Peter Stanley, a putative father who had
developed a parental relationship with his children, of custody of
his children without a judicial proceeding. 7 ' Peter Stanley and Joan
Stanley lived together intermittently for nearly twenty years prior
to Joan's death, and during this time they raised three children. 72
Although Joan and Peter had a common last name, they never were
married." After Joan Stanley died, the state of Illinois instituted a
dependency proceeding under the Illinois custody statutes, declared
the children wards of the state and placed them with court-ap-
pointed guardians. 74 Illinois based its actions on a statute that con-
clusively presumed that all unwed fathers were unfit parents." Peter
argued that, because Illinois law did not make a similar presumption
about married fathers or unwed mothers, the Illinois law violated
the equal protection clause. 76
Although Peter never advanced a due process argument, Jus-
tice White, writing for the majority, analyzed Peter's claim in terms
of the due process clause. 77 The Court determined that it was per-
missible to engage in a due process analysis because this method of
analysis was available to the Illinois state courts. 78 Justice White,
relying on past precedent, reasoned that the integrity of the family
unit and an individual's right to maintain familial relationships are
basic liberty interests that are protected by the Constitution, re-
gardless of marital status. 79 Because of these liberty interests, Justice
White held that, absent a compelling state interest, Peter's interest
in maintaining his parental relationship, which had developed over
a period of eighteen years, deserved constitutional protection. 8°
b" Id. at 244.
69 Id. at 245.
7" Id. at 247-48.
71 405 U.S. 645,658 (1972).
72 Id. at 646.
73 Id.
" Id.
75 Id. at 648-49.
Id. at 646.
" Id. at 650-51.
7" Id. at 658,11.10.
7° Id. at 650-51.
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In footnote nine of his opinion, justice White suggested that
putative fathers have a general right to be heard prior to a termi-
nation of their parental rights. 81 Although the Court emphasized
the substantiality of Peter's relationship as a crucial element of his
liberty interest, 82 footnote nine seemed to indicate that any level of
involvement by a putative father is sufficient to create a liberty
interest." justice White reasoned that, because there was not a
judicial finding that Peter was an unfit parent, the state did not
have a valid interest in terminating Peter's parental relationship. 84
Justice White concluded that, because the state required judicial
determinations of unfitness to terminate the parental rights of mar-
ried parents, divorced parents and unwed mothers, Illinois's con-
clusive marital presumption violated the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. 8 •
Numerous commentators have discussed the effect of the Stan-
ley decision on the rights of putative fathers." Commentators have
argued that the greatest source of confusion in the Court's opinion
is footnote nine. 87 This confusion resulted because footnote nine
CL Id. at 657 n.9.
"2 Id. at 651.
" 5 See R.A.W.	 supra note '33, at 23-24.
" Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657-58.
" Id.
"6 See, e.g., K. REDDEN, FEDERAL REGULATION OF FAMILY LAW 71-74 (1982); Note, The
Grudging and Crabbed Approach to Due Process for the Unwed Father: Lehr v. Robertson, 16
CONN. I,. REV. 571, 574-76 (1983) [hereinafter Note, The Grudging and Crabbed Approach];
Comment, Domestic Relations—Parental Rights of the Putative Father: Equal Protection and Due
Process Considerations, 14 MEN.	 U.L. REV. 259, 261-63 (1984) [hereinafter Comment,
Domestic Relations]; Note, Adoption: The Rights of the Putative Father, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 583,
584-85 (1984); Gunmen', Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights, supra note 5, at 298-304.
87 R.A.W. Howe, .supra note 33, at 4. In footnote 9 of Stanley, the Court stated:
We note in passing that the incremental cost or offering unwed fathers an
opportunity for individualized hearings on fitness appears to be minimal. If
unwed fathers, in the main, do not care about the disposition of their children,
they will not appear to demand hearings. If they do care, under the scheme
here held invalid, Illinois would admittedly at some later time have to afford
them a property focused hearing in a custody or adoption proceeding.
Extending opportunity for hearing to unwed fathers who desire and claim
competence to care for their children creates no constitutional or procedural
obstacle to foreclosing those unwed fathers who are not so inclined. The Illinois
law governing procedure in juvenile cases, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 37 § 704-1 et seq.,
provides for personal service, notice by certified mail, or For notice by publi-
cation when personal or certified mail service cannot be had or when notice is
directed to unknown respondents under the style of "All whom it may Concern."
Unwed fathers who do not promptly respond cannot complain if their children
are declared wards of the State. Those who do respond retain the burden of
proving their fatherhood.
405 U.S. at 657 n.9,
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failed to state whether the constitutional protection accorded to
Peter Stanley should be extended to all putative fathers or only to
those who have had a substantial level of involvement in raising
their children. 88 ComMentators also have noted that the Court's
opinion does not clearly define what form notice must take or what
procedural requirements are constitutionally necessary. 8" Another
aspect of the Court's opinion that commentators have criticized is
that the Court ultimately based its decision on equal protection
grounds but analyzed the case in terms of clue process. 9° Critics
have stated that this has led to confusion with regard to the consti-
tutional source of putative fathers' rights."'
The Supreme Court attempted to answer many of these ques-
tions and refine the Stanley holding"2 in the 1978 case of Quilloin V.
Walcott. 13 In Quilloin, the Court held that Leon Quilloin, the putative
father, had no constitutional right to veto the adoption of his chil-
dren because, unlike the putative father in Stanley, he had not
established a substantial parental relationship with his children."
Leon Quilloin and Ardell Walcott conceived a child who was born
in 1964. 95 Ardell maintained exclusive custody and control of the
child." During this time, Leon did not provide child support, nor
did he spend time with his child or object to Ardell's exclusive
custody of the child."' In April 1967, Ardell married Randall Wal-
cott, and in 1976, Randall, with the consent of Ardell, petitioned to
adopt the child."8 Subsequent. to the filing of the petition, however,
Leon sought to block the adoption." Under Georgia statutory law,
Leon was not allowed to veto the adoption.'" Leon argued that the
Georgia statute violated the equal protection and clue process
clauses of the Constitution, because it denied parental rights without
a particularized hearing."' The state responded that, because Leon
a Continent, Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights, supra note 5, at 302-03.
x" K. aiwrc, supra note 86, at 73.
"" R.A.W. Howe, supra note 33, at 24-25.
"' Comment, Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights, supra note 5, at 300-01.
"2 R.A.W. Howe, supra note 33, at 27.
"1 434 U.S. 246 (1978).





"!" Id. at 247.
"" Id. at 247-48.
' 01 Id. at 252.
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had made no attempt to legitimate the child during the eleven years
preceding the adoption petition, he did not have a constitutional
right to a hearing regarding his fitness as a parent. 1 °2
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected
Leon's claim that the Georgia law was unconstitutional." The Court
reasoned that Leon had not developed a substantial parental rela-
tionship like the one that existed in Stanley. 104 Because Leon had
not developed a substantial parental relationship, he had no pro-
tectable liberty interest.m The state, therefore, was only required
to determine that the termination of Leon's parental relationship
was in the best interests of the childi° 6 The Quilloin Court further
stated that, because Leon did not have custody of the child and had
not carried the burden of parental obligations at. any time during
the child's life, the equal protection clause did not require that Leon
be granted the same parental rights as a rnarriecl or divorced fa-
ther. 107
Commentators have interpreted the Court's decision in Quilloin
as limiting the breadth of the Stanley decision.'" Legal analysts have
reasoned that the Court limited Stanley by stating that only some
putative fathers, specifically those substantially involved in their
child's life, were to be accorded constitutional protection.'" Other
commentators point out that the Quilloin decision did not specifically
state what. minimum level of involvement is necessary to create an
interest that merits constitutional protection. 110 Furthermore, legal
analysts have reasoned that the Quilloin decision seemed to imply,
but did not expressly state, that unless the putative father exhausts
all statutory procedures available for asserting his paternity, he will
be barred from asserting that he was not accorded sufficient due
process.'"
In 1979, one year after the Quilloin decision, the Supreme
Court decided the case of Cahan v. Mohammed." 2 In Cahan, the Court
l 02 Id. at 254.
" Id. at 255-56.
104 id,
105 Id. at 254.
106 Id,
107 Id. at 256.
110 R.A.W. Howe, supra note 33, at 32.
I 09 See Comment, Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights, supra note 5, at 307-08.
'Ill K. REDDEN, .supra note 86, at 76.
"I RA. W. Howe, supra note 33 at 32; see also, Comment, Boundaries of Putative fathers'
Rights, supra note 5, at 307-08.
112 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
1184	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol. 31:1173
held that a New York statute that made a gender-based distinction
between the custody rights of the mother, Maria Mohammed, and
the putative father, Abdiel Caban, violated the equal protection
clause because the distinction was not substantially related to an
important state policy. 13 Although Abdiel raised a due process
claim concerning the state's failure to provide him with a particu-
larized hearing, the Court did not reach this question. " 4
The parties in Caban lived together for five Years. 15 During
that time they held themselves out as married and had two chil-
dren."" Abdiel was listed as the father on both of the children's
birth certificates."' During this five-year period, Abdiel and Maria
both contributed to raising and supporting the children.' IS In 1973,
Maria left Abdiel and moved in with Kazim Mohammed, whom she
married shortly thereafter. 19 For the next nine months, Abdiel
visited the children on a weekly basis.' 2" In 1974, while the children
were visiting Maria's mother in Puerto Rico, Abdiel gained posses-
sion of the children from Maria's mother. 121
To regain custody of the children, Maria and her husband
instituted a custody proceeding against Abdiel and his new wife. 122
The family court placed the children in the temporary custody of
Maria and granted Abdiel visitation rights. 123 Subsequently, Maria
and her husband petitioned to adopt the children, and Abdiel and
his wife initiated a cross-petition for adoption.'" The Surrogate in
Kings County, New York denied Abdiel's petition because New York
statutory law granted Maria the right to veto the adoption of her
children.' 25 Because the New York statute did not grant the putative
father a similar right to veto the adoption, Maria and her husband
were allowed to adopt the children.' 26
Abdiel appealed this decision and the decision of the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court, which had affirmed the
" 3 Id. at 394.
"4 Id.
" 5





' 21 Id. at 382-83.
122 id, at 383.
123 /611,
124 id.
175 Id. at 383-89.
1211 Id.
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findings of the Surrogate, to the United States Supreme Court. 127
Abdiel argued that New York's domestic relations law violated the
equal protection clause and denied him his parental relationship
without due process of law.' 28 Maria contended that the adoption
was in the child's best interest and, therefore, that the lower court's
ruling should be upheld. 129
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, viewed the equal pro-
tection issue as arising from the distinction that New York law made
between unmarried fathers and unmarried mothers.' 30 Justice Pow-
ell determined that such a distinction could be constitutionally per-
missible only if it were substantially related to achieving an impor-
tant state interest."' Justice Powell reasoned that the state's
determination that the unwed mother's parental relationship was
always stronger and closer than the putative father's was a broad
and impermissible generalization. " 2 Finally, justice Powell con-
cluded that, although the state did have an interest in promoting
the adoption of illegitimate children, this interest was not suffi-
ciently compelling to justify the gender distinction present in the
New York law.' 33
Although the Court's decision in Cabral provided some guid-
ance with regard to the scope of the rights of putative fathers, 13 "
the case was not without critics.'"' According to commentators, the
Caban decision left three areas of confusion in its wake. First, critics
state that the Caban decision did not clarify the amount of parental
involvement required for the putative fathers' rights to merit con-
stitutional protection.' 36 Second, the Court failed to clarify whether
the natural mother is under any obligation to allow such a relation-
ship to develop."' Third, critics claim that. Caban failed to define
clearly the exact scope of the notice requirement when a putative
father's rights are subject to termination.' 38
127 Id. at 384-85.
12" Id. at 385.




132 Id. at 389.
'" Id, at 391-92.
1 " Continent, Domestic Relations, .supra note 86, at 263.
' 33 See, e.g., H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 830 (2d ed.
1983); K. REDDEN, supra note 86, at 79.
136 Note, Lehr v. Robertson: Procedural Due Process and Putative Fathers' Rights, 33 DE.
PAUL. L. REv. 393,401 (1984) 1hereinafter Note, Procedural Due Process).
137 Note, The Grudging and Grabbed Approach, supra note 86, at 582-83.
' 3" R.A,W. Howe, supra note 33, at 42.
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In 1983, the Supreme Court decided Lehr v. Robertson and
restricted the putative father's right to notice of the adoption pro-
ceedings.'" In Lehr, the Court held that a New York statute that
only provided notice of adoption proceedings to putative fathers
who registered with the "putative father registry" did not violate
the clue process or equal protection clauses of the Constitution.'"
Because Jonathan Lehr, the putative father, had not registered with
the putative father registry, the Court held it was permissible for
New York to deny him notice of a hearing to adopt his child."'
The parties in Lehr, Jonathan Lehr and Lorraine Martz,
stopped cohabiting shortly after the birth of their daughter, Jessica,
in 1976. 142
 Eight months after the birth of the child, Lorraine
remarried, and she and her new husband petitioned to adopt Jessica
in 1978.'43
 During those two years, Jonathan neither provided sup-
port nor spent substantial time with Jessica.'" Jonathan claimed
that his absence for those two years was due to the fact that Lorraine
had hidden Jessica from him."' In March, 1979, the family court
granted the Robertsons' adoption petition. 146
 Jonathan contended
that the adoption was invalid because he had a constitutional right
to receive notice of the proceeding, and he never received such
notice. 147
New York law requires that notice of an adoption proceeding
be given to any man who informs the putative father registry that
he may be a child's biological father.'" To register with the putative
father registry, the putative father must notify the registry and
identify the child or children whom he claims to have fathered.' 49
The family court rejected Jonathan's claim that he had a constitu-
tional right to receive notice.'" The Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Jonathan did
15" 463 U.S. 248,261 (1983).
11" Id. at 263-65,267-68.
'Id. at 256,267-68.
" 2 Id. at 249-50.
" 3 Id. at 250.
'44 Id. at 249-50.
" 3 Id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).
11" Id. at 250.
1.17 Id,
148 N.Y. Soc. Seay. LAIN § 372-c (McKinney 1983) establishes a putative father registry
to record the names of men who wish to express their intent to claim paternity. Registering
entitles the putative father to receive notice of any adoption proceedings regarding their
child. Id. § 384-c.
14" Id. § 372
- c.
ir'" Lehr, 463 U.S. at 253.
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not file with the registry he was not entitled to notice of the adoption
proceeding: 5 ' The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed, rea-
soning that Lorraine and her husband had not obtained the adop-
tion order fraudulently and that the trial court had not abused its
discretion. 152
 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Jon-
athan argued that the due process and the equal protection clauses
of the Constitution invalidated the New York statutory scheme.'"
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion for the Lehr Court.'"
In denying Jonathan's due process claim, the Court reasoned that
because Jonathan's parental relationship with his child was not as
substantial as the parental relationship established in Stanley and
Caban, it did not merit the same amount of procedural protection.'"
The Court concisely stated that a biological link alone does not
create a liberty interest.''" The Court used similar reasoning to
refute Jonathan's equal protection arguments.'" The Court deter-
mined that, because Jonathan had failed to develop a substantial
parental relationship, his situation was not akin to the child's moth-
er's situation.'" Because Jonathan and Lorraine, the child's mother,
were not similarly situated, the Court held that the equal protection
clause permitted the state to make a gender-based distinction in this
case.''" Furthermore, the Court held that this gender-based distinc-
tion was substantially related to the important state policy of main-
taining a workable adoption system." 0
Justice White argued in dissent that the majority analyzed Jon-
athan's parental interest incorrectly. 161
 Justice White reasoned that
the Court should have examined the nature of Jonathan's interest
and not the weight of that interest. 1 "2
 Justice White determined that,
because Jonathan's interest was parental in nature, it was a funda-
mental liberty interest that required constitutional protection.'" 3
151 In re Adoption of Jessica "XX," 77 A.1/2d 381, 383-89, 434 N.Y.S.2d 772, 773-74
(1980).
152
 In re Adoption of Jessica "XX," 54 N.Y.2d 417, 430, 430 N.E.2d 896, 902, 446
N.Y.S.2d 20, 26 (1981).
15" Lehr, 463 US. at 255.
154 Id. at 249.
155 Id. at 261.
1511 Id.
157 Id, at 266-67.
' 58 Id. at 267-68.
'" Id, at 268.
'flu See id, at 266 n.25.
"" Id. at 269-70 (White,,., dissenting).
155
 Id. at 270 (White,.]., dissenting) (emphasis added).
' 6' See id.
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Justice White further reasoned that, even if one assumed that the
majority used the proper analysis, the Court ignored the crucial
fact that Lorraine, the child's mother, had prevented Jonathan from
developing a more substantial parental relationship." The dissent
concluded that the state's interest in the finality of adoption pro-
ceedings did not justify denying Jonathan notice of the adoption
proceeding. 165
Several commentators have attacked the Court's opinion in
Lehr. 166
 For example, one commentator argued that the Lehr deci-
sion further clouded the question of exactly how substantial a re-
lationship must exist between the putative father and the child to
merit constitutional protection. ' 67 This same commentator also crit-
icized the Lehr decision for overemphasizing technical formalities
and thereby ignoring the value of a putative father's liberty interest
and the amount of protection that interest deserves.' 68 The Lehr
majority has also been criticized for interpreting the Caban decision
as relevant to due process issues, when the Caban Court specifically
focused on equal protection issues.' 6 •
Another critic attacked Lehr as a major regression by the Court
because the Lehr decision gave renewed legal force to the presump-
tion that all unwed fathers who have not had a substantial role in
the development of their children are unfit parents.'" A further
flaw in the Court's reasoning, according to the same commentator,
is that the Court failed to acknowledge that a constitutional chal-
lenge to statutes that adversely affect the putative father's rights
may take many years. t7[ Thus, the child's interest in a "stable" family
environment will always override the liberty interest of a putative
father who was in the process of developing a parental relationship
prior to litigation.'?' Based on these circumstances, a putative father
' 64 Id. at 271 (While, J., dissenting).
Id. at 275,78" (White, J., dissenting).
R.A.W. Howe, supra note 33, at 49; see, e.g., Note, The Grudging and Crabbed Approach,
supra note 86, at 594-607; Note, Procedural Due Process, supra note 136, at 395,407-40. But
cf. Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption, supra note 36, at 387-89 (this commentator states
that the Lehr case was properly decided, and that the Court's opinion correctly balanced the
rights of putative fathers against the state's interest in preserving marital integrity).
' 07 Note, Procedural Due Process, supra note 136, at 407.
I" See id. at 408.
'° Id. at 408 n.1 13.
17" Note, The Grudging and Crabbed Approach, supra note 86, at 594.
121 Id. at 603-04.
172 See id.
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would never have an incentive to challenge an unconstitutional
law. M
Iii 1973, the UPA codified the law of illegitimacy, as it applies
to the rights and legal status of illegitimate children, into a uniform
body of law."4 The year before the UPA was officially adopted, the
Stanley case effected a major development in the law of illegitimacy
regarding the custody rights of putative fathers.'m As the Stanley
line of reasoning evolved, the divergence became more distinct.'?
Whereas the UPA had a stabilizing effect on the law of illegiti-
macy,'” the Stanley line of cases generated more questions than
answers regarding the rights of putative fathers."8 Specifically, the
Stanley line of cases had a destabilizing impact on the ability of states
to terminate the rights of putative fathers.'"
C. The Effect of the Stanley Line of Cases on the State's Ability to
Terminate Putative Fathers' Rights' 8"
In the view of several family law scholars, the Stanley decision
sounded a death knell for the traditional state policy of ignoring
the parental rights of putative fathers. 18 ' The implication of the
Stanley line of cases for state legislators was that putative fathers
could not be treated as a homogeneous class without regard to the
quality of their relationship with their children. 182 In response to
the Stanley decision, some state legislatures have altered the statutory
procedures for terminating putative fathers' parental rights.'" Sim-
' 73 /d.
"' UNIV. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note, 911 U.L.A. 287-88 (1987).
17" Id. at 289.
176 UNIT. PUTATIVE: AND UNKNOWN FATHERS ACT, Prefatory Note, 913 U.L.A. 22 (Supp•
1990).
1 " See Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAst. L.Q. 1, 1 (1974); Note, The Uniform
Parentage Act: An Opportunity to Extend Equal Protection to All Kansas Children, 19 WASHBURN
L.J. 110, 115 (1979).
UPUFA, Prefatory Note, 913 U.L.A. 22 (Stipp. 1990).
179 See K. REDDEN, supra note 86, at 73; Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father and Termination
of Parental Eights: Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 FAM. L.Q. 527, 527 (1975).
18" Because Michael If. relates to the constitutionality of California's. conclusive marital
presumption statute, CALIF. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1990), this section will focus on recent
California cases that have construed section 621.
Po K. REDDEN, supra note 86, at 73; Barron, supra note 179, at 527.
lu Comment, Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights, supra note 5, at 318.
1 " 3 After the Stanley decision, the following states amended their adoption statutes:
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York,
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ilarly, some state courts have begun to interpret statutes that act to
terminate putative fathers' parental rights in light of Stanley.' 84 For
example, in California, several cases raised the question of how the
Stanley line of cases affected the application of section 621 of the
California Evidence Code.' 85 Section 621 states that "the issue of a
wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage." 186 Section 621
is a codification of the common law principle that unless a man is
impotent, sterile or in a foreign land at the time of conception, any
child born to his wife is his legitimate heir.' 87 Section 621 does not
grant a right to rebut the marital presumption unless the mother
consents to such rebuttal.'"
In the 1975 case of In re Lisa R.,'" the California Supreme
Court held that section 621' 9° did not deprive Victor R., the putative
father, of standing to assert his paternity at the annual review of
his alleged child's support status.' 9 ' The child, Lisa R., had been
declared a ward of the state upon a finding that the child's natural
mother and her husband were unfit parents.' 92 Victor R., Lisa's
putative father, attempted to assert his paternity at Lisa's annual
support review.'" The lower court determined that it did not have
jurisdiction to determine paternity and, therefore, ordered Victor
to leave the courtroom.' 94 In reversing the lower court's ruling, the
California Supreme Court reasoned that Victor had developed a
substantial parental relationship of the type that existed in Stanley
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
. Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Note, Adoption: The Rights of the Putative Father, supra note 86, at
598 n.105.
'" See Barron, supra note 179, at 527.
1"s See, e.g.. Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 360, 703 P.2d 88, 91, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 748, 751 (1985); In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 640, 532 P.2d 123, 125, 119 Cal. Rptr.
475, 477 (1975); In re Melissa G., 213 Cal. App. 3d 1082, 1091, 261 Cal. Rptr. 894, 898
(1989); Roe v. California Superior Court, 14 Fain. L. Rep. (RNA) 1450, 1450 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 17, 1988); Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 619, 624, 179 Cal. Rptr. 9, 11 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1982).
"45 CAL. EVID. CODE ANN'. § 621 (West Supp. 1990).
187 Cindus v. Lewis, 93 Cal. App. 2d 90, 90, 208 P.2d 687, 688 (1949) (discussing the
evolution of marital presumption from English common law to American common law to
California Civil Code).
"8 Michael H. v. Gerald 1)., 109 S. Ct. '1333, 2340 (1989).
"9 13 Cal. 3d 636, 651, 532 P.2d 123, 133, 119 Cal. Rptr, 475, 485 (1975).
IN See .supra note 13 for text of section 621.
' 91 Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d at 651, 532 13,2d at 133, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
1 " 2 Id. at 640, 532 P.2d at 125, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
'" Id. at 640 n.1, 532 P.2d at 125 n. 1, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 477 n.l.
194 Id.
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and, therefore, the application of section 621 to this case was a
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution."'"
Vincent B. v. Joan R., a 1982 case decided by the California
Court of Appeal, is another example of how the California state
courts have construed section 621.' 9" The Vincent B. court held that
section 621 precluded the putative father, Vincent B., from assert-
ing his paternity because the mother's husband asserted that he was
the child's father."' In this case, Vincent B. filed a paternity action
four years after the child's mother and her husband were di-
vorced.'" The mother and her husband were cohabiting at the time
of conception and the husband was neither sterile nor impotent
during the relevant time period.'" The court gave three reasons
for its holding. 20° First, the court reasoned that, because Vincent B.
had not developed a substantial parental relationship like the one
in Stanley, he had no constitutionally protected right to assert his
paternity. 261 Second, the court determined that the mother's interest
in denying Vincent parental rights outweighed Vincent's rights be-
cause her relationship with the child was more substantial than
his. 202 Finally, the court stated that it would be counter to the child's
best interests to grant Vincent parental rights. 203 Thus, contrary to
the Lisa R. court, the Vincent B. court held that section 621 denied
putative fathers the right. to assert paternity. 20 ''
Later California cases, however, have refrained from viewing
section 621 as a completely conclusive presumption."' In the 1988
case of Roe v. California. Superior Court, 206 the California Court of
Appeal held that section 621 did not. bar the natural mother, who
"5 Id. at. 651, 532 P.20 at 133, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
I'I 126 Cal. App. 3d 619. 622, 179 Cal. Rptr. 9, 10 (1982).
152 Id. at 627-28, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
111 ' Id. at 622, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
hl. at 623, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
1`"" Id. at 625-28, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 11-13.
211 Id. at (126, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
21 ' 2 Id. at 625-26, 179 Cal. Rim-, at 12.
2 " 3 Id. at 627-28, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
2'' Id. at 622, 179 Cal. Rptr, at 10,
2" In re Melissa G., 213 Cal. App. 3d 1082, 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1989); Roe v. California
Superior Court, 14 Fain. L. Rep. (RNA) 1450 (Cal. Ct. App. June 17, 1988). In the case of
In re Melissa 0., which was decided after Michael II., the California Court of Appeal deter-
mined that section 621 was unconstitutional where it would require the state to place one
child, Melissa, with her putative father and place her sister, Shannon, in a foster home. 213
Cal. App. 3d 1082, 1091, 261 Cal. Rptr. 894, 898 (1989). The court determined that both
Melissa and Shannon should he placed in a foster home together. Id.
2" 14 Fain. L. Rep. (RNA) 1450 (Cal. Ct. App. June 17, 1988).
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had been married at the time of the child's birth, from pursuing a
support action against the child's putative father. 2°7 The court stated
that, even though none of the statutory exceptions was relevant,
the application of section 621 to this case would be a denial of the
mother's right to due process. 2°8
Commentators have indicated that the state courts have not
interpreted the Stanley line of cases uniformly. 209
 The divergent
interpretations of the effect of the Stanley line of cases on the
constitutionality of the conclusive presumption of section 621 in
California reflects this lack of uniformity. 21 " Nonetheless, the Stanley
decision and its progeny have had a great impact on state adoption
and custody statutes. 2 " Statutory responses to Stanley have included
paternal registration schemes212
 and efforts to expand the notice
requirements of adoption statutes218 but, like state court responses,
there has been little uniformity among the states. 2 "
D. The Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act 215
In 1984, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws began to research and draft the Uniform Putative
and Unknown Fathers Act (UPUFA). 216
 A desire to eliminate the
confusion among state legislatures about how to interpret footnote
nine of the Stanley decision, as well as the Stanley line of cases
generally, was the motivating factor behind the drafting of the
UPUFA. 217




" UNIV. PARENTAGE AcT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 287, 289 (1973).
210 See Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 360, 703 P.2d 88, 91, 216 Cal. Rptr.
748, 751 (1985); In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 640, 532 P.2d 123, 125, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475,
477 (1975). For example, in In re Lisa R., the Supreme Court of California held that section
621 did not deny the putative hither of a ward of the state the right to offer evidence of his
paternity. By contrast, in Michelle W., the Supreme Court of California held that a putative
father was foreclosed from asserting his paternity where the child was not a ward of the
state.
2 " K. REDDEN, supra note 86, at 73; Note, The Strange Boundaries of Stanley: Providing
Notice of Adoption to the Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REV. 517, 518 (1973) [hereinafter
Note, The Strange Boundaries of Stanley].
20 Note, The Strange Boundaries of Stanley, supra note 211, at 527-31.
21' See supra note 183 for a list of states that altered their adoption statutes after Stanley.
214
 See Barron, supra note 179, at 532.
010
 UPUFA, 93 U.L.A. 22 (Stipp. 1990). An earlier draft of this uniform law was entitled
The Uniform Rights of Putative Fathers Act." Id., Prefatory Note, at 22.
271i
217 Id.
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and the state are the parties whose rights and interests are most
directly affected by the Stanley line of cases. 21 A The UPUFA, there-
fore, is structured to protect and advance these rights and inter-
ests.219
 Accordingly, the UPUFA's "fundamental objective" is to pro-
tect the best interests of the child. 22" The UPUFA's intent is to codify
the common law developments of putative fathers' parental
rights. 22 i Finally, the UPUFA seeks to protect. the interests of the
state. 222
The UPUFA allows the court to protect the right of the child
to be free from a detrimental parent-child relationship with the
putative father. 225
 The UPUFA accomplishes this objective by di-
recting the court to separate the issue of the putative father's pa-
ternity from the issue of granting custody or visitation rights. 22.1 The
first issue is resolved by determining the validity of the putative
father's paternity claim; the second is resolved by determining
whether it would be in the child's best interest to allow the putative
father to assert his parental rights once he is adjudicated to have
such rights. 225
The UPUFA codifies putative fathers' parental rights in four
major ways. 226 First, the UPUFA provides a detailed definition of
the term "putative father."227 Second, the UPUFA thoroughly de-
fines the scope of notice that putative fathers are entitled to receive
whenever a proceeding commences that could potentially terminate
or substantially alter their parental rights. 228
 Third, the UPUFA sets
forth a detailed list of the factors relevant to the determination of
the scope and extent of putative fathers' rights.229
 Among other
factors, the UPUFA recommends that courts consider:
[T]he nature and quality of any relationship between the
man and the child; the reasons for any lack of a relation-
In' Id. at 22-24.
219 Id.
22" Id. at 24.
22 ' Id. at 22-23. The UPUFA Prefatory Note also cites U.S. Census Bureau statistics
indicating that illegitimate births, as a percentage of all births, ruse from 5.3% in 1960 to





	 § 6(d) and accompanying comments, at 33-35.
225 Id.
225 See id. §§ 1-5, at 24-32.
227 Id. § 1, at 24-25.
22" Id. §§ 3-4, at 27-30,
22" Id. § 5, at 31-32.
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ship between the man and the child. . . . whether the man
visits the child, has shown any interest in visitation, or,
desiring visitation, has been effectively denied an oppor-
tunity to visit the child.... the circumstances of the child's
conception, including whether the child was conceived as
a result of incest or forcible rape; whether the man has
formally or informally acknowledged or declared his pos-
sible paternity of the child. . . . 230
Finally, the UPUFA provides the putative father with the right to
bring an action to determine his paternity."
Commentators conclude that the state has two primary interests
to protect when a putative father seeks to assert his parental
rights.232
 First, the state has an interest in protecting the child's best
interests. 233 The UPUFA embodies this primary interest, because
the UPUFA's fundamental objective is to protect the best interests
of the child. 23't Second, the state is interested in protecting the
integrity of familial relationships.'" If, however, two different fa-
milial relationships conflict and one must be preserved at the ex-
pense of the other, the state cannot arbitrarily favor one relationship
over the other. 23" The UPUFA  avoids arbitrary determinations and
promotes reasoned decision-making because it directs the reviewing
court to consider specific factors relevant to an evaluation of puta-
tive fathers' parental rights."'
Commentators also observe that the state has a secondary in-
terest in protecting marital relationships from frivolous paternity
actions brought by putative fathers."'" In states that have adopted
the UPA,239
 the UPUFA does not alter the procedural safeguards
in state paternity laws because the UPA already grants putative
fathers the right to bring paternity actions on their own behalf."'
23° Id.
" I Id. § 2, at 26.
2" Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption, supra note 36, at 372.
253 Id.
UNIF. PUTATIVE: AND UNKNOWN FATHERS ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. at 24.
'4' 5 Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption, supra note 36, at 372.
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979).
2" See supru notes 229-230 and accompanying text for a discussion of factors relevant
to an evaluation of putative fathers' rights.
", Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption, supra note 57, at 372.
299 States that have adopted the UPA are: Alabama. California, Colorado, Delaware,
Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Table of jurisdic-
tions, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1989).
2 ' 10 UNIF. PurATIvE AND UNKNOWN FATHERS ACT 2 and accompanying comment, 9B
U.L.A. 22, 26-27 (Stipp. 1990).
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In states that have not adopted the UPA, however, the UPUFA
creates a new cause of action that gives putative fathers the right to
initiate a paternity suit, but leaves the state free to regulate the
procedures for this cause of action. 241 States, therefore, may adopt
procedures to protect marital relationships as long as these proce-
dures do not arbitrarily destroy a putative father's opportunity to
assert parental rights. 242
Finally, the drafters of the UPUFA realized that the Michael H.
v. Gerald D. case would have an impact on the rights of putative
fathers.243
 The reason is that the primary issue in Michael H. was
the constitutionality of a conclusive marital presumption, and the
Court had not previously ruled on this issue. 244
 Because this issue
had not been resolved prior to the final draft, the commissioners
opted to omit this issue from the UPUFA and instead await the
Court's decision. 245
a
E. Michael H. v. Gerald D.
On October 11, 1988, the United States Supreme Court heard
oral arguments in the case of Michael H. v. Gerald D. 2" Michael H.
was decided on June 15, 1989. 247 The Court, through a main opin-
ion written by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
affirmed the ruling of the California Court of Appeal and held that
the termination of Michael H.'s parental relationship on the basis
of the conclusive presumption in section 621 was constitutional. 248
Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part, in which
Justice Kennedy joined, 24" and Justice Stevens concurred in the
judgment. 25" Justice Brennan dissented from the main opinion, and
was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. 25 ' Justice White
issued a separate dissent that Justice Brennan joined. 252
24I Id.
242 Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979).
299
	 2 and accompanying comment, at 26-27 (Stipp. 1990).
'244
 Michael I.I. v. Gerald 0., 109 S. Ct. '1333, 2336, 2360 (1989) (White, J., dissenting).
245 UPUFA § 2 comment, at '26-27 (Supp. 1990).
24" 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2336 (1989).
247 Id.
248
 Id. at 2341, 2345.
249 M. at 2346 (O'Connor and Kennedy, IV, concurring in part).
220 Id. at 2347 (Stevens, j., concurring in the judgment).
251 Id. at 2349 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
252 Id, at 2360 (White, J., dissenting).
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In Michael H. v. Gerald D., Carole D., the wife of Gerald D.,
had an affair with Michael H. 253
 Nearly three years after the affair
began, Carole gave birth to a baby girl named Victoria D. 254 Al-
though Gerald D. was listed as the father on the birth certificate,
Carole believed that Michael might be the child's true father. 255
Carole, Michael and Victoria subsequently underwent blood tests,
and the results showed that there was a 98.07% probability that
Michael was Victoria's father. 256
Eventually, Carole ended her affair with Michael and recon-
ciled with her husband. 257 Carole then denied Michael access to
Victoria, and, in response, Michael initiated court proceedings to
have his paternity of Victoria judicially established. 258 Gerald even-
tually intervened in the case, and moved to have the action dis-
missed pursuant to section 621, which conclusively presumed him
to be Victoria's father because he was married to and cohabiting
with Carole at the time of Victoria's birth. 259 Because Michael was
not permitted to rebut the statutory presumption of Gerald's pa-
ternity, the California Superior Court dismissed his case on sum-
mary judgment. 26° The California Court of Appeal affirmed the
decision of the lower court, 2" and Michael appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, claiming that section 621 violated his due
process rights under the fourteenth amendrnent. 262
At the outset, Justice Scalia, writing the plurality's main opin-
ion, stated his belief that the facts of this case were extraordinary. 263
Justice Scalia analyzed Michael's procedural due process claims and
then his substantive due process claims. 2" In holding that the con-
clusive presumption in section 621 was constitutional, Justice Scalia
reasoned that, although section 621 was facially a procedural rule,
it was actually a substantive rule of law because it advanced the







254 Id. at 2337-38. See supra note 13 for the text of section 621.
261) Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2338.
26 ' Michael H. v. Gerald I)., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1013, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810, 821 (1987).
262
 Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2338.




"5 Id. at 2340.
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Justice Scalia, therefore, determined that Michael's procedural
claims failed because he had improperly characterized the statute
as procedural.!"''
In analyzing Michael's substantive due process claim, Justice
Scalia reasoned that Michael had failed to establish that his rela-
tionship with Victoria was .a liberty interest because putative fathers
have never had a right to assert paternity over a child born to a
married woman. 2"7 Michael's parental relationship, therefore, could
not possibly rise to the level of a liberty interest. 268 Justice Scalia
defended this conclusion in footnote six of his opinion by stating
that an analysis of societal traditions is the proper way to evaluate
substantive due process claims. 26• Using. this societal tradition anal-
ysis, Justice Scalia determined that the rights of putative fathers
have always been subordinate to the state's interest in preserving
the integrity of the marital unit. 276 Although Justice O'Connor con-
curred with Justice Scalia in part, she refused to concur with foot-
note six of the opinion because she reasoned that it was inconsistent
with the manner in which the Court analyzes clue .process claims. 27 '
Justice Stevens, concurring in the result, wrote a separate opin-
ion. 272 Justice Stevens reasoned that Justice Scalia's opinion was too
restrictive because it precluded' the possibility that the pinative fa-
ther could develop a parent-child relationship if the child's mother
was married. 273 Justice Stevens stated that the Stanley line of cases
stood for the proposition that in some instances, a putative father's
relationship with his child could rise to the level of a liberty interest,
even if the child's mother was married. 274 Furthermore, Justice
Stevens assumed that Michael's parental relationship was sufficiently
substantial to give him a constitutional right to a hearing. 273 Justice
Stevens reasoned that, although Michael's parental relationship did
not give him a right to be declared a parent, Michael's parental
relationship could make him an interested third party. 276 Because
266 Id. at 2341.
2" Id. at 2342-95.
21111 Id.
2""
	 at 2344 n.6.
27" Id. at 2342-45.
271 Id. in 2346-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).




"" Id. at 2347-48 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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section 4601 of the California Civil Code2" gives courts the discre-
tion to grant reasonable visitation rights to any person who has an
interest in the child's welfare, Michael, as an interested third party,
could petition the court for visitation privileges. 278 Justice Stevens,
therefore, concluded that Michael's parental rights had not been
unconstitutionally abridged because section 4601 provided ade-
quate protection of those rights. 279
In his dissent, Justice Brennan attacked, as excessively fact-
specific and unprincipled, Justice Scalia's conclusion that Michael
did not have a liberty interest. 2" Justice Brennan supported this
argument by emphasizing that although five Justices agreed that
Michael could have a liberty interest, only the Chief Justice uncon-
ditionally endorsed Justice Scalia's conclusion that Michael never
could have a liberty interest. 2 " Justice Brennan also criticized Justice
Stevens's conclusion that section 4601 adequately protected Mi-
chael's parental relationship. 282 Justice Brennan reasoned that Mi-
chael's parental relationship with Victoria was familial in nature
and, therefore, was a constitutionally protected liberty interest that
could not be adequately protected by the mere possibility of gaining
visitation rights. 28"
Justice White also dissented and attacked Justice Scalia's due
process analysis. 284 Justice White interpreted the Stanley line of cases
as meaning that a putative father's parental relationship with his
child acquired constitutional protection once he became substan-
tially involved in rearing the child, regardless of the mother's mar-
ital status. 285 Therefore, Justice White stated that Michael had a
constitutionally protected right to maintain his parental relationship
with Victoria. 2"
Although the Court decided Michael H., it did not develop a
uniform line of reasoning. 287 In the main opinion, Justice Scalia
s77
	 CIV, Cons: § 4601 (West Stipp. 1989).
2" Section 4601 slates in pertinent part: "kin the discretion of the court, reasonable
visitation rights may be granted to any other person having an interest in the welfare of the
child." Id. (emphasis added).
'7'J
	 H., 109 S. Ct. at 2348-49 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
2" Id. at 2349-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
291 Id.
2" Id. at 2355-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
285 Id. at 2351-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
2" Id. at 2360-63 (White, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 2361 (White. J., dissenting).
'55 Id.
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determined that Michael's relationship with Victoria was not a lib-
erty interest, and, therefore, did not require constitutional protec-
tion.'" In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens reasoned that,
although Michael could have a constitutionally protected interest,
the laws of California provided sufficient due process to protect
that interest."" Thus, although the Court gave several distinct ra-
tionales for its holding, the final result was a determination that
Michael's parental relationship could be terminated without an op-
portunity to rebut the marital presumption in a judicial hearing. 2""
I. THE EFFECT OF MICHAEL H. ON THE RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE
FATHERS
Early common law principles in both England and the United
States denied the putative father of all custodial rights regarding
his illegitimate childrdn. 2"' Prior to the UPA there was no uniform
statutory law regarding illegitimacy. 292 The UPA was intended to
make the law of illegitimacy more uniform and to remove the legal
and social stigmas traditionally placed on the illegitimate child. 293
In 1972, in the case of Stanley v. Illinois, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that the Constitution protects putative fathers'
parental rights. 2"4 This case was the first in a line of cases that
analyzed and discussed the constitutional rights of putative fa-
thers. 2 "5
The most recent case in the Stanley line of cases is Michael H.
v. Gerald D., in which a plurality of the Court held that it was
constitutionally permissible to terminate a putative father's parental
rights without a judicial hearing if the child's mother was married
at the time of birth.2"" Several months before the Michael H. case
was decided, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws promulgated the Uniform and Unknown Putative
299 Michael II., IOU S. Ct. at 2343-44.
'2"" Id. at 2347 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
29° Id. at 2343-44,2347.
'4"' See Su/IV notes 30-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of early common law
principles.
2" See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state of the law
prior to the enactment of the Ul'A.
293 See supra 1101CS 50-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the UPA.
29' See sup) notes 65-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Stanley case.
295 See supra notes 92-214 and :accompanying text for a discussion or the Stanley line of
cases.
"6 See supra notes 246-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of ihe Michael II.
case.
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Fathers Act.297 The Stanley line of cases has generated a great deal
of confusion regarding the extent and scope of the rights of the
putative lather. 2" The United States Supreme Court failed to clarify
any of this confusion when it decided Michael H. 299 I n sharp contrast
to the inability of Michael H. to clarify the rights of the putative
father, the UPUFA codifies, standardizes and protects the rights of
the putative father."°
The main issue in Michael H. v. Gerald D. was the constitution-
ality of section 621 of the California Evidence Code, a statute that
created a conclusive marital presumption."' This issue presented
the Court with a convenient opportunity to delineate clearly the
scope and meaning of the constitutional rights of putative fathers
to maintain parental relationships with their children. 302 Instead,
the Court issued a Plurality decision in which the analyses of the
dissenting Justices were more unified than the contradictory ration-
ales propounded by Justices Scalia and Stevens.'" As a result, the
Michael H. decision represents a missed opportunity to bring order
to this particular area of fathers' rights. Because lower courts have
difficulties interpreting plurality opinions," the Michael H. decision
will almost certainly further confuse the scope of the rights of
putative fathers.
Because the Court did not put forth one rationale in a plurality
opinion, it is necessary to discern which opinion will ultimately be
relied upon by lower courts. Because Justice Scalia based his holding-
on a restrictive interpretation of the extent of putative fathers'
rights, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Stevens refused to join fully
in Justice Scalia's opinion. 305
 Moreover, the four dissenting justices
2" UNIV. PUTATIVE AND UNKNOWN FivritErts Act., 911 U.L.A. 22, 24 (Supp. 1990).
See .supra notes 209-214 and accompanying text for a discussion of the confusion
created by the Sinniey line of cases.
299 See infra notes 301-326 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Michael H.
case.
'°° See supra notes 216-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of UPUFA.
3°' Michael H. v. Gerald 0., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2338 (1989).
" See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need for a
clarification of the law of putative fathers' rights.
30' The opinions of the Court are contradictory because. whereas Justice Scalia reasoned
that Michael H. had failed to prove the existence of either a sufficiently developed parental
relationship or a "liberty" interest, Justice Stevens assumed the existence of both of These
circumstances, yet reasoned that Michael had received sufficient process. 109 S. Ct. at 2341—
49.
m" Note, Precedenlial Value, supra note 9, at 758. The note states: "Faced with ambivalent
signals and discrete, often contradictory rationales, lower courts feel compelled to guess how
a majority of Justices would resolve the particular legal issue presented. .. ."
3"5 See supra notes 264-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the main and
concurring opinions.
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indicated that they agreed with Justice Stevens's interpretation of
the scope of putative fathers' rights, but they disagreed with his
reasoning that California law adequately protected Michael's paren-
tal relationship.'" It is, therefore, unclear how much precedential
weight Justice Scalia's opinion will actually have.
Justice Scalia's analysis seems inconsistent with the Court's rea-
soning in• Quilloin. and Lehr."7 In those cases, the Court acknowl-
edged that the putative father always has the potential to develop
a relationship sufficient to merit constitutional protection." Justice
Scalia, on the other hand, reasoned that Michael H. had no potential
to gain a "liberty interest" in his relationship with Victoria.'" Justice
Scalia viewed the legal issue as resting on determining the parental
rights society has traditionally accorded putative fathers when their
child was born to a married woman.' 19 After an historical analysis
of this issue, justice Scalia determined that the parental rights of
putative fathers in Michael's situation have traditionally been
deemed subordinate to the state's interest in preserving marital
integrity.'" By reasoning that a putative father, in this situation, can
never have a liberty interest in his child, Justice Scalia ignored the
legal reasoning of the Stanley line of cases. The Stanley line of cases
stands for the proposition that once a putative father has developed
a parental relationship, that relationship deserves constitutional
protection.'" 2 Thus, Justice Scalia's opinion is inconsistent with the
Court's own precedent.
According to Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia's analysis rejected
the Court's prior decisions in the Stanley and Cahan cases, both of
which held that in certain circumstances, a putative father's rela-
tionship with his children deserves constitutional protection. 3 '" In
contrast to justice Scalia's opinion, justice Stevens reasoned that a
putative father in Michael's position could have a constitutionally
protected parental relationship.'" Furthermore, justice Stevens as-
""6 Michael II., 109 S. Ct. at 2349, 2355-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting); a. at 2360-63
(White, J.. dissenting).
1117 Sec supra notes 93-111, notes 139-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Qui/loin and Lehr.
"D" See id.
4"' See supra notes 263-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Scalia's
reasoning.
tiro See id.
3 " Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333,2342-45 (1989).
412
 See, e.g., K. REDDEN, mow note 86, at 73; Comment, Boundaries of Putative Fathers'
Bights, ,cupra note 5, at 290.
813 See supra notes 65-91, notes 112-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Stanley and Coheir?.
3" Michael lf. , 109 S. Ct. at 2347 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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sumed that Michael's parental interest was a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest."'" Moreover, the four dissenters agreed with
Justice Stevens's opinion that Michael's parental interest potentially
deserved constitutional protection."'" In this regard, Justice Ste-
vens's opinion is fully consistent with the Stanley line of cases:317
Justice Stevens's conclusion that section 4601 of the California
Civil Code adequately protected Michael's liberty interest is incor-
rect because under his analysis, Michael has a weaker right to vis-
itation than a presumed or legal parent would have. The reason is
that, without a determination of paternity, a court would only con-
sider Michael to be an "interested third party" and, therefore, he
would be forced to pursue his request for visitation privileges under
part two of section 4601. 318 Part two of section 4601 gives the court
complete discretion in determining the extent of the visitation rights
of an "interested third party" like Michael:319 By contrast, section
4601 mandates a parent's right to visitation absent a finding that
visitation would not be in the child's best interest. 320 Thus, a parent
has a greater right to visitation than an interested third party. By
following Justice Stevens's reasoning, which assumed that Michael's
parental relationship was sufficient to merit constitutional protec-
tion, it is permissible to pare away important aspects of a putative.
father's rights as long as they are not eliminated completely. 32 ' Once
the Court allows states to erode the putative father's right to have
a parent-child relationship, it becomes impossible for the putative
father to secure the full value of this right. Under the Stevens
analysis, the crucial issue is whether the state has provided a pro-
cedure that could preserve some aspect of the putative father's
parental rights. If the state has provided such a procedure, then
the Constitution does not bar a conclusive marital presumption that
3 '' Id.
See supra note 281 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Brennan's
dissent.
31 ' See supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Stevens's
reasoning.
sra The second sentence of section 4601 states, "bin the discretion of the court, reason-
able visitation rights may he granted to any other person having an interest in the welfare
of the child." CAL, CIV. COUE § 4601 (West 1991)). Thus, a court could accord Michael only
the rights of an interested third party.
519 Id. § 4601 (West 1990).
"0
 The first sentence of § 4601 states: "the court shall order reasonable visitation rights
to a parent unless it is shown that the visitation would be detrimental to the best interests of
the child." Id.
321 See supra notes 276-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Stevens's
opinion.
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terminates the putative father's remaining parental rights without
a judicial hearing.
This reasoning is inconsistent with the Stanley decision. Under
Stanley, once a putative father establishes a sufficiently developed
relationship with.his child, he is entitled to parental rights that are
equal to the rights of every other class of parent. 322 When analyzed
under the due process clause, as applied by the Stanley line of cases,
section 621 is unconstitutional because the Lehr decision stands for
the proposition that, once a putative father willingly assumes the
full burdens of parenthood, his parental relationship gains full
constitutional protection. 323 Under a true Stanley analysis, a statute
such as section 621 is unconstitutional because it denies all putative
fathers the right to enjoy a full parental relationship, regardless of
the level of the putative father's parent-child relationship. The opin-
ions of the plurality in Michael H. are, therefore, inconsistent with
precedent in this area.
Moreover, the Court's opinion ignores current domestic reali-
ties.324 The view that the decision ignores reality is borne out by the
statistical evidence stating that the number of "illegitimate" births,
as a percentage of all births, increased from 5.3% in 1960 to 22%
in 1985. 325 These statistics show that Justice Scalia's statement that
the facts of Michael H. and the resulting domestic complications are
unusual3215 is mere wishful thinking.
Because Michael H. was a plurality decision, the law of putative
fathers' rights has been further confused and remains fraught with
"2 See supra notes 65-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sian/4.
323 See supra notes 154-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Lehr case.
324 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2359 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In
Michael H., Justice Brennan stated in dissent that;
The atmosphere surrounding today's decision is one of make-believe. Be-
ginning with the suggestion that the situation confronting us here does not
repeat itself every day in every corner of the country, . . . moving on to the
claim that it is tradition alone that supplies the details of the liberty that the
Constitution protects, and passing finally to the notion that the Court has always
recognized a cramped vision of 'the family,' today's decision lets stand Califor-
nia's pronouncement that Michael—whom bltiod tests show to a 98 percent
probability to be Victoria's father—is not Victoria's father. When and if the
Court awakes to reality, it will find - a world very different from the one it
expects.
Id.
32'' See supra note 221 fOr an explanation of how these statistics motivated the drafters
of UPUFA.
32" See supra note 263 and accompanying text for Justice Scalia's statements regarding
the facts of Michael IL
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numerous unanswered questions. 327 In Michael H., the main opinion
rejected the reasoning of five Justices that putative fathers could be
accorded constitutional protection even if the child's mother is mar-
ried. 328 Therefore, a pressing need exists for clarification of this
area of the law. The Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act
provides the clarification and reform necessary to preserve the pu-
tative fathers' constitutional rights without abridging the rights of
the mother and child and without ignoring important state poli-
cies.32"
Because the UPUFA is a codification of state and Supreme
Court case law dealing with the rights of the putative father, it will
eliminate the confusion created by the numerous decisions in this
area. The success of the UPA in clarifying the related issue of
illegitimacy has shown how a comprehensive uniform set of laws
can alleviate the problems and confusion created by jumbled com-
mon law decisions."° Prior to the enactment of the UPA, the law
of illegitimacy was in a state of confusion similar to the present state
of the law of putative fathers' rights."' Just as the UPA's clarification
of the law helped to protect the rights of the illegitimate child, the
UPUFA will protect the rights of the putative father.
The UPUFA codifies nearly every important aspect of putative
fathers' rights."2 Specifically, the UPUFA clearly delineates the
scope of the notice to which a putative father is entitled whenever
a judicial proceeding begins that could substantially alter his paren-
tal rights.'" The UPUFA also codifies the factors that the Court
has found relevant to determining whether the putative father has
developed a relationship that merits constitutional protection.'" By
codifying the Court's holdings in relation to these particularly con-
fusing issues, the UPUFA eliminates the uncertainty of interpreting
the Stanley line of cases.
327 See supra notes 86-91, 108-11, 134-37, 166-78 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the confusion created by the Stanley line of cases.
324 See supra note 281 and accompanying text for Justice Brennan's conclusion that a
liberty interest could exist.
329 See supra notes 215-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of UPUFA.
3" See supra note 177 and accompanying text for a discussion of the UPA.
33 ' See supra notes 35-49, 52-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state of
illegitimacy laws prior to the adoption of the UPA.
"2 See supra notes 221, 226-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of UPUFA.
"' See supra note 228 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope of the notice
provided by UPUFA.
334 See supra note 230 for a list of factors courts should use when analyzing putative
fathers' rights.
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Another reason that the UPUFA will have a stabilizing influence
on this area of the law is that the UPUFA recognizes. current do-
mestic realitics. 335 The title of the Act acknowledges the dramatic
rise in the number of putative and unknown fathers in our society
in the past two decades. 336 Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H. is
content to ignore statistics and assumes that illegitimate births are
rare occurrences. 337 The UPUFA, on the other hand, is acutely
aware of these statistics, and actually cites them as a motivating
force behind the Act.. 338
The major area that the UPUFA still leaves open to confusion,
however, is that it does not adequately protect the putative father
from the conclusive marital presumption."" Whenever circum-
stances make the conclusive marital presumption applicable, a con-
clusive marital presumption statute such as section 621 allows the
state to terminate the parental relationship of the putative father
without a hearing."' This conclusive presumption violates the equal
protection clause because it prefers one type of familial relationship
over another."' The state does not have the authority to pick and
choose arbitrarily among the many types of familial relationships
and protect some relationships more than others. 342 The conclusive
marital presumption also violates the due process clause because it
arbitrarily abridges a constitutionally protected liberty interest. 343
The drafters acknowledged that the UPUFA is silent regarding
conclusive marital presumptions because they specifically looked to
the Court to resolve this question when it ruled on Michael H. 344
Because Michael H. was a plurality opinion, however, it did not
conclusively resolve this question. Justice Scalia reasoned that sec-
tion 621 standing alone would always be constitutional, but this
opinion was only completely supported by Chief Justice Rehnqu-
3" 5 See supra note 221 for a discussion,of the motivational role of these statistics.
See id.
"7 See supra note 263 and accompanying text for a discussion of justice Scalia's opinion.
"8 See supra note 221 for a discussion of the motivational rote of these statistics.
"2 See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of UPUFA's position
regarding the marital presumption.
3" See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 621.
741 See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional
protections accorded to familial relationships.
"2 Id.
993 id .
94 .See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of UPUFA's position
regarding the marital presumption.
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ist. 34" Justice Stevens, in recognizing that a liberty interest existed
in Michael H., a view shared by the four dissenters, determined that
section 621 would not be constitutional unless it was accompanied
by a statute resembling section 4601, which provides the putative
father with a minimum level of procedural protection for his visit-
ation rights.34 " Conversely, the four dissenters were united in
strongly arguing that section 621 would always be unconstitu-
tional. 3 '
Based on the various opinions in Michael H., it seems that the
bare constitutional minimum requires conclusive marital presump-
tions to be coupled with a statute, such as section 4601, which
provides the putative father with a judicial means of acquiring
visitation rights. In the past, however, the Court has observed that
the bare constitutional minimum is not always the best way to pro-
mote public policy."18 Thus, the best way for states to accord putative
fathers the full value of their constitutional rights and, thereby,
fulfill their obligation to protect parental relationships, is to repeal
the conclusive marital presumption statutes prior to enacting the
UPUFA. This will protect putative fathers from having their paren-
tal rights terminated without a judicial hearing. By adopting the
UPUFA, state legislatures will be enacting a comprehensive body of
law that is consistent with the constitutional mandates of the Stanley
line of cases. 349 At the same time, the UPUFA provides state courts
with a coherent framework to evaluate the existence and extent of
putative fathers' parental rights. 35°
III. CONCLUSION
Both statutory and common law regarding the rights of puta-
tive fathers are confused and unsettled at this time. Most statutory
945 See supra. lanes 280-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of which Justices
joined, concurred, or dissented.
"" See supra notes 275-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of justice Stevens's
opinion.
s " 	 supra notes 280-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dissenting
opinions.
34" Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 34 (1981). In denying an indigent
father whose parental rights had been terminated a right to state appointed counsel, the
Court stated in dicta that the decision did not imply that state appointment of counsel was
not a better public policy. Id.
34" See supra notes '116-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of this aspect of
UPUFA.
"" See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of this aspect of
UPUFA.
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law in this area is based on outmoded English common law princi-
ples as well as outdated "traditional" state policies and conceptions
of domestic life. These statutes do not adequately protect the rights
of putative fathers. Although the United States Supreme Court, in
the 1972 Stanley decision, recognized that the right of putative
fathers to have and maintain a parental relationship with their
children is a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the line of
cases that followed Stanley failed to define clearly the exact scope,
nature and extent of this interest. State courts and legislatures have
been unable to discern fully the meaning of these cases. The latest
Supreme Court case in this area, Michael H., failed to resolve the
confusion created by these earlier cases and will most likely add to
the confusion because it did, not adequately define the constitutional
limits of the conclusive marital presumption.
The Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act represents a
codification of the Stanley line of cases with an enhanced under-
standing and incorporation of current domestic reality. The UPUFA
will clarify this area of law because it provides both state courts and
legislatures with a standardized and coherent interpretation of the
rights of putative fathers. Moreover, the UPUFA advances valuable
state interests by protecting the best interests of the child and the
integrity of familial relationships. By adopting the UPUFA, concur-
rently with repealing the conclusive marital presumption, states will
be able to promote public policy, protect the best interests of chil-
dren and preserve putative fathers' constitutional rights.
DAVID LINE BATTY
